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We present a model of collective action in a heterogenous population of egoists and conditional coop-
erators. Each player is uncertain about the cooperative inclinations of the other player. A government or
principal who has information about the distribution of types may introduce sanctions for defection. We
study the impact of such sanctions through the e⁄ect on the beliefs of the players about the distribution
of types they are facing. It is shown that in equilibrium sanctions can crowd out trust between agents by
sending a signal that there are many egoists around. This can lead the government to set low sanctions
to induce trust and ￿ crowd in￿cooperation. In cases where conditional cooperation is an important factor
in collective action, as is the case in tax compliance, the model provides a rationale for the low observed
sanctions in the real world.
Keywords: Collective action, trust, incentives, crowding out, conditional cooperation
JEL codes: D83, J30, K42, M52
￿Laws are partly formed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live
on friendly terms with another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose
spirit can not be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil.￿
Plato - The Laws
1 Introduction
What determines cooperation in collective action problems has been a core problem for social scientists since
the beginning of the discipline. Ever since Hobbes threatened the infamous ￿ war of all against all￿in the 17th
century, the dominant strand of literature highlights the role of sanctions in coercing people to cooperate.
But contemporary empirical research shows that people manage to ￿nd ways to cooperate even without the
presence of government. There is substantial evidence that society has a large proportion of so called conditional
cooperators: agents that condition the decision to cooperate on what they think others do. Collective action
problems between conditional cooperators are therefore a matter of coordination rather than coercion. This
puts trust in the centre of attention for research into collective action problems.
Thus, if society is indeed a heterogenous mix of egoists and conditional cooperators, a pressing and largely
ignored question is how coercion and trust can be combined to induce cooperation. How do sanctions and trust
￿I would like to thank Rick van der Ploeg for his support, Sanne Zwart, Joel Sobel, Pascal Courty, Tobias Broer, Javier Rivas,
Cor van der Weele, Ken Binmore, Bastiaan Overvest, Mark LeQuement, and Anindya Banerjee for useful comments, and above all
Karl Schlag for his commitment.
1relate to each other, and how should the government optimally use sanctions when society consists of both
egoists and conditional cooperators?
This paper o⁄ers an answer to these questions by presenting a model in which trust and coercion interact
in determining cooperation. It argues that there is a trade-o⁄ between sanctions and trust. High sanctions
are necessary when there are many egoist around, but they may also ￿ crowd out￿trust, because conditional
cooperators will infer that being sel￿sh is the norm. This in turn decreases the willingness of conditional
cooperators to cooperate. As a consequence, the government can ￿ crowd in￿cooperation by setting low sanctions.
Because it has superior information about the distribution of types in society, the government can use the low
sanction policy to signal a social norm of cooperation.
The point of departure of the model is a population of heterogeneous agents: While some of them are sel￿sh,
others are conditional cooperators. The agents are randomly matched in a 2 person game that, depending on
the cooperative preferences of the participants, is either a prisoners dilemma or a coordination game. They
know their own type, but not that of the other player. It can thus be rational to either cooperate or defect,
depending on a player￿ s own type and the expectation of the type of the other player. We include a government,
that knows the distribution of agent￿ s types in society, and that can alter the payo⁄s of the game by introducing
sanctions for defection.
We show that if conditional cooperators can coordinate on mutual cooperation, there is a unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which the government sets high sanctions when there are many egoists in society, and
low sanctions when there are many conditional cooperators. This means high sanctions give a negative signal
to the conditional cooperators and crowd out trust between citizens. Furthermore, the asymmetric information
about distribution of types in society implies that average sanctions in society are lower than what they would
be if citizens knew the distribution. The reason is that the government can induce trust and thereby ￿ crowd
in￿cooperation from it citizens by setting low sanctions. We also characterize the welfare costs incurred by
a ￿ Hobbesian￿government, that acts upon the idea that all people are egoists. Such a policy is unnecessarily
costly when there are many conditional cooperators.
Benabou and Tirole (2003) present a model of crowding out in the context of a principal and a single agent.
Sliwka (2007) considers a signalling e⁄ect of incentives in a principal-agent context. He models a psychological
game where agents change their preferences depending on the policy they observe. We build on the approach
of Benabou and Tirole, but focus on a collective action problem. That is, on the e⁄ect of the signal on the
behavior of agents towards each other, rather than towards a principal. Furthermore, in contrast to Sliwka, we
do not use a psychological game. Instead we achieve the result by adding heterogeneity of types to a standard
collective action framework.
The model has applications in collective action problem in large scale societies or organizations. Perhaps
the clearest application is tax evasion. Being tough on tax evasion sends a mixed message: although evaders are
being punished, they must be numerous to be taken so seriously. The model asserts that the reason why real-
world policies of tax evasion often feature low sanctions, is that governments rely on the reciprocal preferences
of the tax-payers. The model suggest a rationale for evidence that raising sanctions on tax evasion has very
little, or even a negative e⁄ect on tax evasion (She⁄rin and Triest, 1992). Other applications are support for the
welfare state, free-riding in public transportation or team work in organizations. In all these cases, the article
tries to shed light on a balancing act that the principal must perform: It must deter those who are, to speak
with Plato, inclined to ￿ plunge into evil￿ , while maintaining the good men￿ s motivation to live on friendly terms.
22 Literature
There is an increasing amount of evidence for the existence of so-called conditional cooperators. A conditional
cooperator is someone who will cooperate if she thinks others will do so as well. Fehr and G￿chter (2000) and
G￿chter (2006) review the evidence on conditional cooperation from public good games and ￿eld experiments.
They conclude that a large amount of studies ￿nds much more cooperation than standard economic theory allows
for, and that this evidence can be comfortably explained by reciprocal preferences. However, there is substantial
heterogeneity in these preferences for reciprocity or conditional cooperation. Fischbacher and G￿chter (2006)
among others, provide experimental evidence for the existence of a number of stable types. They ￿nd that close
to 55% of their subjects act as conditional cooperators, 25% act as pure free riders, and the rest shows more
complicated behavior, that often resembles conditional cooperation in the relevant range of play.
Another source of evidence for conditional cooperation comes from ￿eld experiments that study contribution
levels to charities. The results of four studies surveyed in G￿chter (2006) are that those subjects who received
information that others contributed a lot also contribute a lot. For example, Frey and Meyer (2004) ￿nd that
students contribute signi￿cantly more to charity funds and have higher expectations of future contribution levels
by others, if they were told that others contributed more in the past.
The existence of conditional cooperators implies that trust is crucial variable for cooperation. Without being
overly sophisticated we can de￿ne trust in a collective action setting as a person￿ s belief that others in society
are trustworthy. The literature on trust in economics has largely been concerned with the consequences of
trust for the economy. However, the question of how beliefs are determined by institutional arrangements has
received much less attention.
One idea that has gained ground is that sanctions have an impact on trust. Kahan (2005) calls the idea that
incentives have social meaning the expressive dimension of incentives. Incentives express information about
the social values and norms in society. Consequently, Kahan argues, a blanket crackdown on defection by the
government in the form of high sanctions will give people the idea that non-cooperation is the prevailing social
norm. To the extent that people are conditional cooperators, this reduces their own willingness to cooperate.
This dual role of incentives is the main message of this paper. In our setup, incentives have the traditional
motivational e⁄ect that economists take them to have, but they also shape the perceptions of people about the
conduct of others in society.
This phenomenon falls into the category of what is commonly called ￿ crowding out of intrinsic motivation￿ .
The debate about the adverse e⁄ects of incentives in psychology has been going on for decades, and in the last
ten years it has spilled over to economics. The point of the debate is that material incentives appear to have
more complex e⁄ects than just their impact on a person￿ s economic trade-o⁄s. If people have an ￿ intrinsic￿
motivation to perform a certain task, this motivation can be enhanced (crowded in) or diminished (crowded
out) by external incentives. This e⁄ect has been dubbed ￿ motivation crowding￿ , and can lead a person to react
di⁄erently to incentives than standard economic theory predicts. Many studies have found these crowding e⁄ects
in economic settings (see Frey and Jegen (2001) for an overview).
A beautiful illustration is provided by the widely cited paper by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a). In their
￿eld experiment they consider ten day-care centers in Haifa. In ￿ve of them they introduce a ￿ne for parents
who pick up their children late. In these ￿ve centers the number of late-comers went up signi￿cantly in the
weeks after the introduction of the ￿nes and stayed up relative to the control group after the ￿nes had been
withdrawn.
An increasing amount of studies documents similar ￿ndings in collective action problems. A ￿eld experiment
among Colombian farmers (Cardenas et al., 2000) had the form of a common pool problem. In absence of explicit
incentives, extraction levels were not far above the optimum. But when monitoring of extraction levels and a ￿ne
for over-extraction were introduced, farmers started to extract more rather than less. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee
3(1997) ￿nd that people are less likely to accept siting of waste facilities in their neighborhood when they are
o⁄ered ￿nancial compensation for it. Ostmann (1998) provides experimental results that show that external
enforcement ￿nanced by experiment participants only reduces harvests in common pool problem by a small
amount relative to a no-enforcement treatment.
In contrast to the growing empirical literature, there is not yet much theoretical work on the informational
role of incentives. Two papers model the adverse e⁄ects of incentives through their e⁄ect on agent￿ s beliefs
in a principal-agent context. In Benabou and Tirole (2003) the principal has more information about the
characteristics of a job and the ability of an agent to do it than the agent himself. The incentives that the
principal chooses to introduce are therefore a signal to the agent that he might not be suitable, which diminishes
his motivation for the job.
Sliwka (2007) also considers a principal-agent context, in which there are three types of agents in an orga-
nization: altruists, who take into account the principals payo⁄, egoists, who maximize their own payo⁄, and
conformists, who do whatever they think the majority does. Because preferences of conformists depend on their
beliefs about others, this is a psychological game. In this setting, high incentives signal to the conformists that
most people are sel￿sh and this in turn will cause them to exert minimum e⁄ort. The principal may thus choose
to trust rather than control the agents.
In contrast to these approaches we study a collective action framework. That is, we focus on the impact of
incentives on the interaction between agents rather than between agent and principal. We adapt the framework
of Benabou and Tirole (2003) by incorporating multiple agents and model strategic interaction between them.
As in Benabou and Tirole (2003), the incentives that the government uses carry information, but instead of
learning something about their own type, the agents learn something about the type of the other player. In
contrast to Sliwka (2007), we do not need to model a psychological game to accomplish a signalling e⁄ect
of incentives. In our model beliefs do not induce a preference change but serve the more traditional role of
anticipating payo⁄s. The signalling e⁄ect arises simply from adding preference heterogeneity to a standard
collective action framework.
Finally, outside a principal agent context, Zwart (2006) provides a model where policies designed to solve a
problem may back￿re because of their e⁄ects on the beliefs of agents in the economy. Zwart considers IMF loan
provision to a country, where investors have a noisy signal of the economy￿ s fundamentals. Intervention by the
IMF signals that the country faces a problem, which may cause the investors to run.
3 The model
The model is a sequential game of costly signalling with three di⁄erent kinds of players: Two agents, a principal
and nature. The principal can be a government or a manager, and the agents correspondingly citizens or
employees. Applications exist in both public and organizational context (see section 5), but throughout this
section we will frame the problem as a public one, and use the words ￿ government￿ , ￿ citizens￿and ￿ society￿ . We
focus on pure strategy play.
The central idea is the following: The two citizens play a game of incomplete information. In contrast to
standard assumptions, some of the citizens are conditional cooperators. Whether mutual cooperation can be
an equilibrium thus depends on the types of the players, which are drawn independently from a distribution
determined by nature. Nature thus transforms the game into one of imperfect information. The citizens don￿ t
know the distribution of types, but have a prior over the type of the other player.
The government observes the distribution of types in the economy and has an interest in e⁄ecting the outcome
that yields most utility, i.e. mutual cooperation. It can in￿ uence the outcome of the game by introducing what
we call sanctions. The sanctions are observed by the citizens in the economy before they choose their own
4action. Since the government has more information than the citizens, the citizens will make inferences from the
sanctions they observe about the type of others in society. There is thus double-sided asymmetric information:
Citizens have private knowledge of their type and the government has private knowledge of the distribution
of types. In appendix C we analyze the role of asymmetric information in the model and show that it causes
low sanctions to be played more likely in equilibrium. Furthermore, there is only a partial con￿ ict of interest
between the government and the citizens: the government would prefer that the agents knew the distribution
of types. However, low types bene￿t from the fact that their type is only privately known.
3.1 The players
3.1.1 Nature
Nature moves twice. At the beginning of the game, nature draws a distribution of types for the economy from a
class of simple distributions. Every distribution is characterized by the probability ￿ 2 [0;1] that a high type is
drawn from it. We call the distribution characterized by ￿ the state of society, because it re￿ ects the proportion
of conditional cooperators relative to egoists in the economy. The probability that nature picks a given state of
society is given by a uniform distribution with support on [0,1].
After nature has chosen the state of society, the government observes it and sets its policy. The second move
of nature consists of drawing the two types from the state of society that are matched in a collective action
problem described below. The probability that two high types will be matched is thus ￿2.
3.1.2 The government
The government observes the state of society and therefore the joint distribution of the two types that will be
matched. On the basis of this information it sets incentives g 2 R+. The objective is to induce cooperation
by the citizens in the economy. The instrument to do so is the use of ￿ incentives￿ , a sanction on defection by
the agents. (We will use the words ￿ sanctions￿and ￿ incentives￿interchangeably.) However, introducing such
incentives comes at a cost. The principal￿ s objective function is: W = 1(C;C)B ￿ ￿g.
Here, B is the payo⁄ the principal receives from cooperation of the agents, and the operator 1(C;C) takes
the value of 1 when both agents in the economy cooperate and 0 otherwise. The principal is thus exclusively
motivated by e⁄ecting the cooperative outcome. This can be interpreted as the the social bene￿t that society
experiences from a cooperative outcome, or the pro￿t that a principal makes if his employees work together.
Since many applications of this result are in the public realm, we show in appendix A that all results also hold
for a utilitarian welfare function of the form W =
P
i ui ￿ ￿g.
The costs of setting incentives are given by ￿g. We o⁄er two interpretations for the idea that higher sanctions
carry higher cost. First, one can interpret them as the practical costs of setting higher sanctions, such as putting
police on the street, building jails, maintaining a more extensive judiciary or raising the probability of getting
caught1. Second, the parameter ￿ can measure the moral cost of high sanctions: high sanctions are likely to
meet resistance based on the idea that the punishment should not exceed the crime. Although many people
would agree that stealing a bike is wrong, few would want to institute the death penalty for bike thieves, even
if this were the most e¢ cient way to deter them.
1One can also interpret g as the expected cost ￿f of imperfectly enforced sanctions, where ￿ is the probability of getting caught
for defection and f the level of a ￿ne. The payo⁄ of defection to the agent is ￿D ￿ g which can be seen as a reduced form of
￿￿(￿D ￿ f)+(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿D. Then, g = ￿f, and the term incorporates both the level of a ￿ne and the probability of getting caught.
This suggest a natural interpretation of why the cost of setting incentives increases in the size of g: raising he probability ￿ of
catching defectors is increasingly expensive.
5Note that we do not necessarily interpret the sanctions as ￿nes, and there are no revenues to the government
from the sanctions. Although ￿nes could be part of a sanctioning scheme, we want to focus purely on the
deterring or Hobbesian e⁄ect of sanction and not on the revenue-raising aspect. Note also that sanctions (and
therefore their costs) are determined in place before citizens decide on their actions. This implicitly assumes
commitment by the government to carry out the sanctions once they are in place. We think this is natural in a
setting where sanctions are decided upon by politicians, and their execution and enforcement then carried out
by the executive and judiciary branch of government.
3.1.3 The citizens
Nature randomly draws two citizens i and j from the state of society, who have to solve a collective action
problem. That is, they play a simultaneous move game of incomplete information in which they have to choose
a pure strategy si;j 2 fC;Dg, which speci￿es whether they cooperate or defect. The citizen￿ s utility from
cooperation and defection is given by:
ui(C;sj) = ￿(C;sj) + ￿i1(C;C) (1)
ui(D;sj;g) = ￿(D;sj) ￿ g (2)
Here, the function
￿ : fC;Dg ￿ fC;Dg ! R+ (3)
maps the two strategies into a positive payo⁄. The two additive terms in (1) and (2) are not standard and
warrant further justi￿cation. From (2) we see that the payo⁄ from defection is diminished by the sanction g set
by the government. In (1), the operator 1(C;C)was already de￿ned above and has value 1 if si = sj = C and 0
otherwise. Therefore, citizens derive utility from their payo⁄as usual, but also value cooperation as an outcome
in itself. The parameter ￿i 2 f0;1g indicates the importance of this additional payo⁄ to the individual citizen.
A low type (￿ = 0), or egoist, corresponds to the standard agent in economic literature that cares only about his
own payo⁄s. However, a high type (￿ = 1) will behave like a conditional cooperator as will be explained below.
Nature draws the parameter ￿ from the state of society before the citizens choose their action. The citizens
know their own type but not that of the other player.
Before we give a general structure of the payo⁄s in the game, we illustrate the framework with an example.
Consider the following payo⁄ matrix:
C D
C 4 + ￿i;4 + ￿j 0;5 ￿ g
D 5 ￿ g;0 1 ￿ g;1 ￿ g
The characterization of the game expressed in this matrix depends on both the types and the principal￿ s
policy. For ￿i;j = 0 and a g < 1, the game is a prisoners dilemma. But for ￿i;j = 1 the game is not a prisoners￿
dilemma but a coordination game, due to the additional payo⁄ attached to the cooperative outcome by high
types. Furthermore, for g > 1 cooperation is a dominant strategy for all types.
Note that in this example a high type will act as a conditional cooperator. To see this, we de￿ne pi as
the probability that citizen i attaches to the event that citizen j will cooperate. If we compare the expected
utility from each action, we see that for a high type, E[ui(C)] ￿ E[ui(D)] implies pi ￿ 1 ￿ g. That is, she will
cooperate if and only if her belief that the other citizen cooperates is high enough (relative to the sanction).
This is exactly the de￿nition of a conditional cooperator as de￿ned in the introduction.
Embedding this example in a more general notation we have:
E[ui(C)] ￿ E[ui(D)]
pi[￿(C;C) + pi￿i] + [1 ￿ pi]￿(C;D) ￿ pi[￿(D;C) ￿ g] + [1 ￿ pi][￿(D;D) ￿ g]
6Rearranging yields:
pi￿i ￿ pi[￿(D;C) ￿ ￿(C;C)] + [1 ￿ pi][￿(D;D) ￿ ￿(C;D)] ￿ g
Since we want to study collective action problems we assume that in absence of preferences for cooperation
and sanctions, defection is a dominant strategy : ￿(D;C) ￿ ￿(C;C) = ￿(D;D) ￿ ￿(C;D) = 1. Moreover, we
assume that mutual cooperation Pareto dominates mutual defection: ￿(C;C) > ￿(D;D). As in the example
above, this makes the characterization of the game dependent on the type of the citizens. Abstracting again
from the government policy, we see that for low types the game is a prisoners￿dilemma. For high types it is
a coordination game. Moreover, we have an interaction between sanctions and beliefs, because a citizen i will
cooperate if and only if:
pi￿i > 1 ￿ g (4)
For simplicity we will adopt the tiebreak-rule that indi⁄erent people cooperate2. Then, (4) tells us that a low
type (￿ = 0) will only cooperate when g ￿ 1. In other words, egoists have to be forced to cooperate by high
sanctions. High types (￿ = 1) on the other hand, will cooperate whenever pi ￿ 1 ￿ g. That is, they behave like
conditional cooperators. Note that in this setup a reward for cooperation would have exactly the same e⁄ect as
a sanction on defection. The important thing for our model to work is that the government raises the expected
utility of cooperation of the citizens at a cost to itself.
We call "trust" the belief of a player that the other player is a high type. Note that a certain amount of
trust de￿ned in this way, is a necessary condition for a conditional cooperator to cooperate if sanctions are low
(g ￿ 1). However, it is not a su¢ cient one. Believing that the other is a high type does not imply that one
believes that the other will actually cooperate. Two conditional cooperators truly face a coordination game.
Therefore, our model will not be able to distinguish between multiple equilibria that are associated with trust:
one where conditional cooperators are able to coordinate on cooperation, and one where they are not.
In sum, the citizens are characterized by two functions. The ￿rst speci￿es belief generation. It￿ s domain is
the own type and government policy. It￿ s range is the belief about the type of the other citizen: b : f0;1g￿R+ !
[0;1]. The second function speci￿es the choice of strategy. Its domain is over the citizens own type and the
government policy. Its range is the strategy space: s : f0;1g ￿ R+ ! fC;Dg.
3.2 Timing of the game
Reiterating, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state of society characterized by the probability ￿ that a high type is drawn from it.
2. The government observes ￿ and decides on its policy g.
3. Nature draws two citizens from the state of society who are matched to play a collective action problem.
4. The citizens learn their own type and the government policy g, update their prior, and choose their
strategy s 2 fC;Dg.
2Alternatively, one could raise all the equilibrium sanctions in the paper by ￿.
74 Crowding out of trust
In this section we characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game, consisting of government and
citizens strategies and citizens beliefs: (g;si;sj;bi;bj): After, we discuss its implications. Before doing so, it is
useful to develop some terminology. We refer to the government policy in a pooling equilibrium simply as g,
since the principal always sets the same sanction. We will see that there is what we call a partial pooling (or
semi-separating) equilibrium: an equilibrium with two regions or steps in each of which the government plays
the same policy. The boundary value of ￿ between the regions is called x. We call a region where ￿ 2 [0;x); i.e.
where society consists of relatively many egoists a ￿ bad state of society￿and those where ￿ 2 [x;1] a ￿ good state
of society￿ . We label the government policy for this semi-separating equilibrium as follows: The policy that is
set for the bad state of society is called g1 and the policy for the good state of society is called g2 . Finally, for
our proofs we need to de￿ne o⁄-equilibrium beliefs boe as the beliefs that citizens have when they see a policy
not observed in equilibrium.
We ￿rst establish that there is crowding out of beliefs in equilibrium:





is a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which high types coordinate on cooperation. This equilibrium features
pooling in two intervals, and is characterized by higher sanctions in the bad state of society: g￿
1 > g￿
2. In this
equilibrium the government sets g￿
1 = 1 to coerce everyone to cooperate, and it sets g￿
2 such that it induces
cooperation only from the high types.
Proof. There are at most three di⁄erent policies in equilibrium. The reason is that there are at most three
di⁄erent situation in the economy: One where everybody cooperates, one where only the high types cooperate,
and one where nobody cooperates. If there were more than three policies, two policies must correspond to the
same situation. This cannot be an equilibrium since the government would always deviate to the cheaper policy.
This means that the three policies that are equilibrium candidates are the ones that most cheaply induce the
three situations described above. From the payo⁄s in the citizens￿subgame, we see that setting g = 0 and
g = 1 is the cheapest way of having respectively no cooperation and full cooperation. Whenever B
￿ ￿ 1 we have
that setting g = 1 and inducing full cooperation always yields a higher payo⁄ than setting g = 0 and leaving
everybody to defect, therefore, setting a sanction of 0 cannot be part of the equilibrium policy.
Now we can get the result by eliminating all other equilibria. We start by ruling out pooling equilibria.
Suppose pooling on g￿ = 1. For a high type o⁄-equilibrium beliefs boe satisfy boe > 0, because high types know
that the other citizen is drawn from the same distribution as they are. Then there is an optimal deviation at
￿ = 1, because in this case everybody is a high type and they will cooperate for any sanction 1 ￿ boe ￿ g < 1.
This equilibrium can therefore not exist.
Suppose pooling on g￿ < 1. In this case there is a deviation to g = 1 at ￿ = 0, because nobody is a high
type and there will be zero cooperation under g < 1. Note that the fact that the government can coerce citizens
means that pessimistic o⁄-equilibrium beliefs are not enough to support such a pooling equilibrium.
We thus have a two step semi-separating equilibrium. We know that g￿
1 = 1 because any g1 < 1 yields a
deviation at ￿ = 0. We know that g￿
2 6= 0 because setting g2 = 0 yields no cooperation and a zero payo⁄. It
follows that g2 is such that it is the cheapest way to induce the high types to cooperate (characterized below).
However, for there to be no deviation to g2 < g￿
2 we need that o⁄-equilibrium beliefs are more pessimistic than
those induced by g￿
2.
Proposition 1 is the main result of this paper, and says two things. First, when there are many conditional
cooperators, it is best to implement low sanctions and tolerate a few defectors. This is a simple consequence
from the existence of conditional cooperators, but often overlooked in discourses on collective action. Second,
8there is crowding out of trust in equilibrium, because higher sanctions are associated with a bad state of society.
The intuition is straightforward: a government will punish heavily when she knows that most likely there will
be a lot of egoists around, because this is the only way to insure substantial amounts of cooperation in such
an environment. It will punish less heavily when it expects citizens to be conditional cooperators, because
cooperation can be induced cheaply in such an environment by setting lower sanctions.
What drives this crowding out result? First, society must be a mixture of di⁄erent agents. Second, setting
higher sanctions must be costly to the government. If incentives are free to administer, the government would
always put a perfectly enforced death penalty on every defection and no signal could be provided. The fact
that the government knows ￿ and the agents do not, also in￿ uences the threshold value x. In fact, relative to
a situation with complete information about ￿, the asymmetric information lowers x and enlarges the region
where the low ￿ne is played. The reason is that the government can induce or ￿ crowd in￿trust of citizens by
playing a low ￿ne. This is explained in more detail in section 5.
The reason we can rule out equilibria that feature pooling on low sanctions supported by pessimistic o⁄-
equilibrium beliefs, is that for bad states of society the government would deviate to g = 1. In this case the
government coerces everybody to cooperate, and this makes the o⁄-equilibrium beliefs irrelevant. We can rule
out the pooling equilibrium on g = 1 as well, because in a perfect world where everybody is a high type, the
government can induce full cooperation for a sanction lower than one.
The conditions for the crowding out equilibrium to exist are intuitive to understand. First, the high types
need to coordinate on the cooperative outcome. That is, if a high type thinks the other player is a high type,
she also thinks the other will cooperate. There is also a ￿ Hobbesian￿pooling equilibrium in which high types
coordinate on mutual defection and the government sets g = 1. This makes high types behaviorally equivalent
to egoists, and our analysis collapses to the standard one. The existence of this equilibrium is a consequence of
the fact that the model is not able to select between the multiple equilibria in the game between conditional
cooperators.
Second, other equilibria arise if the cost of setting sanctions becomes too high relative to the bene￿ts of
cooperation (B
￿ < 1), because the coercive sanction g = 1 is now dominated by the low sanction g = 0. It
essentially decides that inducing cooperation is not worth the e⁄ort, at least when there are many egoists.
Consequently, there is a pooling equilibrium on g￿ = 0, supported by pessimistic o⁄-equilibrium beliefs. There
is also an equilibrium that features ￿ crowding in￿ , i.e. g￿
1 = 0 < g￿
2. Only when there are many high types who
will cooperate for low sanctions will it be pro￿table for the government to set any sanctions at all. The reason
we do not focus on these cases is that we want to concern ourselves with collective action problems for which
the stakes are relatively high. We think that in the most important collective action problems in society, such
as tax compliance, the bene￿ts of cooperation justify the costs of high sanctions.
Third, if high types are very optimistic when they see a sanction that is not played in equilibrium, the
government will deviate from the equilibrium in Proposition 1 for all ￿ > x where x < x￿, because o⁄ the
equilibrium path it is cheap to induce high types to cooperate.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium in Proposition 1 further:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 has the following characteristics:
a) the threshold distribution x is increasing in B
￿ . Thus, when the relative cost of setting sanctions goes up, the
high sanction is less likely to be observed,
b) g2 is decreasing in B
￿ . When setting sanctions becomes relatively more expensive, the sanctions in the good
state of society increase.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a few steps. First we characterize the agents￿belief about the distribution of
types in the economy. Agents base their beliefs on the principal￿ s policy and their own type. We are interested
9only in the belief of conditional cooperators (high types) under a sanction g < 1, because this is the only case in
which beliefs matter for the choice of action. Therefore, we look at the belief of agents that observe g2 < 1 and
￿ = 1. The common prior is that each distribution is equally likely to be chosen by nature (and consequently
the probability that the other is a high type is 1
2). Conditional on these pieces of information we compute the
posterior belief b(￿) that a given distribution ￿ has been chosen by nature from Bayes￿rule:
b(￿) = P (p = ￿ j ￿ ￿ x;￿ = 1)
=
P (p = ￿ [ ￿ ￿ x [ ￿ = 1)














1 ￿ x2 (5)
This belief is increasing in ￿: a high type is more optimistic about society than a low type (for which the belief
would be decreasing in ￿).
Second, we look at the best response of the citizens in the economy to any government policy given their
belief and their type. Both types will cooperate under g1 = 1: We know that the best response of a low type
is to defect whenever g < 1. Remains to analyze the case of a high type under g2. The best response of a
high type is to cooperate when his expected utility from cooperation is positive. Expected utility depends on
b(￿) and g: A conditional cooperator knows that in equilibrium the other player will either cooperate for sure
(under g1) or cooperate only if she is a high type (under g2). For each value of x there is a sanction g2 such
that the high type exactly cooperates given her beliefs. The calculation is provided in appendix B, and yields
the relation:






We can verify that g2 is decreasing in x which is intuitive: When x increases, the environment in which the
principal plays g2 shrinks. Therefore, high types are more optimistic when g2 is observed and this in turn lowers
the sanctions needed to induce the high types to cooperate.
Third, now that we know the reactions of all the agents in the economy to all possible government strategies,
we just need to ￿nd the government￿ s optimal strategy. The government will set sanctions g2 according to (6),
because it is the cheapest way to induce cooperation from the high type. Since we know that g1 = 1 and g2
is determined from (6), we need to ￿nd x, which is the state of society for which the government is indi⁄erent
between the two strategies. It is found by setting:
E[W(g1 = 1)] = E[W(g2)]
At distribution x, g1 yields the cooperative outcome for sure and g2 yields the cooperative outcome when both
types are high, that is, with probability x2. We can therefore write:
B ￿ ￿ = x2B ￿ ￿g2(x)









With the help of the implicit function theorem we can establish that x is increasing in B
￿ . This establishes part
a). From (6) we know that g2 is decreasing in x which establishes part b).
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2a). The uninterrupted lines delineate an initial situation that results in a
threshold x (the point where the expected payo⁄s are the same). The policy g1 yields constant welfare of B￿￿;
10because all types cooperate. We see that the welfare from policy g2 increases in the state of society, because
it depends on the proportion of high types. It increases quadratically in ￿, because the probability that both
agents are high types is ￿2.
Suppose B falls exogenously to B0. We can think of this as a fall in the political priority of cooperation in
the collective action problem under consideration. As a result the relative bene￿t of cooperation B
￿ decreases,
expected payo⁄s from both policies fall, but the more so under the high sanction because this gives the principal
bene￿t B for sure. As a consequence, x shifts to the left. That is, the region of distributions for which the
principal will set g = 1 shrinks. In other words, if the bene￿ts of cooperation decline, a government is less
anxious to ensure cooperation through coercion. Similarly, if ￿, the cost of setting sanctions goes up, B
￿ falls,
and higher sanctions will be played less likely.
Figure 1: An exogenous decrease in the relative bene￿t of cooperation.
Note that, no matter how high B
￿ becomes, high sanctions will never be sure to be played (x will never
quite reach 1). The reason is that there will always be a pro￿table deviation to a lower penalty with a perfectly
informative signal at ￿ = 1. Also, from (7) we can compute that in the crowding out equilibrium, x will never
be smaller than 0,48. For lower values of x we need that B
￿ falls below 1, but as we have seen this case leads us
into a new equilibrium.
Result 2b says that when the relative cost of sanctions increases, paradoxically, the sanctions go up for
the good state of society. The reason for this result is that when B
￿ decreases the principal will enlarge the
region where it plays g2. This means citizens adjust their beliefs upon seeing g2 downwards. Consequently, the
principal will have to set a higher sanction to get the high types to cooperate.
In sum then, the results in this section show that under the conditions mentioned above, higher sanctions
may diminish trust in society. The reason is that the principal sets high sanctions only if there are a lot of
egoists, which discourages the high types. Appendix A shows that the results in this section hold similarly for
a utilitarian social welfare function.
115 The role of asymmetric information
An important aspect of the model is the asymmetric information about the state of society. Here, we compare
the case of asymmetric information with a case of complete information, i.e. in which the citizens would know
￿. The derivations of the results in this section are provided in appendix C.
The most important implication of asymmetric information, is that a government can ￿ crowd in￿cooperation
by the citizens. That is, the fact that the citizens do not know ￿ causes low sanctions to be played more
frequently, by shifting down x relative to a world where citizens know ￿. Therefore, low sanctions are more
likely under asymmetric information.
To see this, consider the case when there is complete information about ￿: Similar to the asymmetric
information case, there will be a region of bad states of society in which government sets g1 = 1. There is again
a threshold state of society that we call d, where the government ￿nds that coercion is too expensive relative
to relying on trust between the conditional cooperators. As before, d depends on B
￿ . When the state of society
is above the threshold d, the government will then set g = 1 ￿ ￿, and the high types will cooperate.
To compare the two cases we compare x and d. However, for lack of explicit expressions, we have resort to
simulations. The result is illustrated in ￿gure 2. We see that x < d, which means that asymmetric information
enlarges the set of states of society where low sanctions are optimal.
Figure 2: Threshold policies under symmetric (d) and asymmetric (x) information.
The intuition behind this result is that the government induces trust of citizens by setting a low sanction.
This is possible because the citizens are unsure about the state of society. Consider the lowest possible distrib-
ution d for which the principal will still set low sanctions under symmetric information. Here, beliefs will be d
under symmetric information, because the citizens know exactly what￿ s going on. However, under asymmetric
information beliefs will be bi(g;￿i). Setting low sanctions in this case induces beliefs bi(g;￿i) > d and enlarges
range in which he sets a low ￿ne under asymmetric information. An implication of this result is that, paradoxi-
cally, when information in society about the behavior of others becomes more accurate, the government will on
average (taken over all states of society ￿) set higher sanctions.
However, it is that the ex-ante (before nature chooses ￿) welfare of the government would be higher if people
knew the state of society. Therefore, we should not conceive the signal provided by incentives as revealing
12something that the government would like to cover up. Rather, the government would (at least ex-ante) prefer
￿ to be public, but can not credibly make it so. The signalling e⁄ect is a by-product of the fact that coercion is
necessary only in bad states of society. In the terminology of Kahan (2005), it is truly the ￿ expressive dimension￿
of sanctions.
The reason for this result is that although the government bene￿ts from the crowding in described above,
it cannot bene￿t from the optimism in that would exist in extremely good states of society in a situation of
full information. In the latter situation, it would be able to set even lower sanctions than it can in the case of
asymmetric information.
In sum, asymmetric information enlarges the region where low sanctions are played, and thereby lowers
average sanctions. However, the government is ex-ante better o⁄ under symmetric information.
6 Implications and discussion
We start the discussion with some general remarks, and continue by presenting two extensions to the model
that highlight the importance for policy making of taking into account heterogeneity of types.
First, there is a role for government even in a society that consists mainly of conditional cooperators, where
the collective action problem looks like a coordination problem rather than a prisoners dilemma. Although their
behavior is largely driven by trust, conditional cooperators will still need a little ￿ push in the back￿ , because
they are aware that there are some egoists around which reduces their desire to cooperate. With respect to
the egoists, tolerating the few defectors that there are may have a lower price tag then introducing costly high
sanctions. This latter result follows directly from the existence of conditional cooperators, but is nevertheless
overlooked in many discourses on collective action. Note that this result does not depend on signalling or on
asymmetric information: if citizens perfectly knew the state of society, it would still be true.
Second, the result does not say that compliance goes down when sanctions go up. As in Benabou and
Tirole (2003), incentives are what they call ￿ short term reinforcers￿ . The crowding out does not occur on the
level of behavior, because in this model the higher sanctions ￿ override￿the e⁄ect of diminished beliefs. That
is, under a high sanction, people in society are coerced into cooperation, but will think of their peers as being
essentially egoists. Thus, an econometrician looking solely at the relation between sanctions and cooperation,
would support the standard Becker-Stigler results. However, the econometrician might not observe that as a
result of high sanctions, trust in society is diminished.
Third, the model can explain why a heightened political awareness of a certain collective action problem
can result in increased sanctions. We can interpret a rise in B as an increase in the political importance of a
collective action problem. For example, a new government with di⁄erent priorities can be voted in o¢ ce. As
proposition 2a tells us, the threshold value x between the two policies increases in this case because it now
becomes more important to ensure full compliance. If the political change causes x to increase above the true
state of society, sanctions will increase. The model predicts that such a change in policy will increase compliance,
but will reduce trust. Interestingly, if the true state of society remains above x even after the increase in B
then sanctions will actually go down. The intuition here is that conditional cooperators become more optimistic
when they see that even under the increased political urgency of cooperation no high sanctions are necessary.
6.1 Decreased trust and addiction to sanctions
A way in which decreased trust can have behavioral consequences is through spillover e⁄ects into the future and
into other collective action problems. Trust is an attitude that determines behavior in many social situations.
The crowding out of trust by incentives in one area could therefore have spill-over e⁄ects in other areas. Consider
13a number of similar collective action problems. In each of them, a citizen is randomly matched with another
citizen, whose type is drawn from the same state of society always. Suppose that the government considers
policy for only a single collective action problem, and sets g = 1. This will crowd out trust and the citizen
may now defect in the other collective action problems where sanctions are not coercive enough to overrule the
crowding out e⁄ect. Thus, a raise in sanctions in one policy area may cause a drop in cooperative behavior in
other areas.
Secondly, as remarked by Benabou and Tirole (2003), one can imagine a situation where people think they
would be able to get away with defection, for example because of imperfect monitoring. In this case, only
the negative signalling e⁄ect remains, whereas the coercive e⁄ect of incentives disappears. Another example
of this is when one group in society is subjected to higher sanctions, and another is not. The group that is
exempted may form a more negative opinion of the sanctioned group, even though the people in this group may
now cooperate more. Cooperation of the non-sanctioned with the sanctioned will go down. Section 5 shows
elaborates this idea in an application to support for the welfare state.
Finally, sanctions may have spillover e⁄ects into the future. Since the government cannot undo an infor-
mation transmission, trust may not easily return. For example, when high sanctions are exogenously lowered
(for reasons not described in the model) after they have been introduced, cooperation may see a large drop, as
even the by now cynical high types will refuse to cooperate. This is consistent with experimental evidence as
in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) or G￿chter (2007). These studies show that when incentives are withdrawn,
cooperation does not return to pre-incentive levels.
A proper analysis of these cases is a task for future research. Souvorov (2003) has worked in this direction,
and shows an intertemporal ￿ addiction to rewards￿in a two-period model of a principal and a single agent. In
the context of our model, spillover e⁄ects will result in an ￿ addiction to sanctions￿as principals will need to
resort to ever more controlling measures to compensate for the reduced trust.
6.2 The welfare cost of treating people as egoists
The standard view espoused by much of modern economics and political science holds that people are by
and large egoistic, i.e. ￿ = 0. Given the prominence of this paradigm, we brie￿ y look at the social welfare
resulting from a ￿ Hobbesian￿government that embraces this view. That is, suppose that the government does
not maximize its objective function taking into account its information, but instead sets a blanket policy of high
incentives. Depending on the bene￿ts of cooperation and the cost of setting sanctions, this may be ine¢ cient
in terms of the government objective function, because most people can be induced to cooperate by convincing
them that others do so, without recourse to costly sanctions.
The ex-post (after nature has chosen the state of society) e¢ ciency cost C of setting the high sanctions in
a good state of society is:
C = E[W(g2)] ￿ E[W(g1)]
= (￿2B ￿ ￿g2) ￿ (B ￿ ￿)
= B(￿2 ￿ 1) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ g2)





= B(￿2 ￿ x2) (8)
Where we used (6) to go from the third to the fourth line and (7) to go from the fourth to the ￿fth line. Note




so that the cost of misspecifying the penalty is a function only of B
￿ and the state of society ￿.
14The intuition underlying (8) is straight forward. Costs increase in the distance of the realized state of
society from the policy threshold x, i.e. when there are more conditional cooperators in society. The further
this distance, the bigger the ￿ mistake￿in setting high sanctions. Furthermore, costs increase in ￿, because a
higher ￿ lowers x. The e⁄ect of B is ambiguous: On the on the one hand, cost rise in B because more money
is at stake, so a higher B ampli￿es any error of the policy maker. On the other hand, a higher B raises x and
thereby lowers cost.
7 Applications
The potential applications of the model described in this paper are various. In fact, they are everywhere where
the conditions of the model are met: The principal has more information than the agents, some agents behave
as conditional cooperators, and sanctions are costly. We discuss two applications that are very important in
modern societies for which we think our model is relevant: tax compliance and the support for the welfare
state. Other applications in the public realm include fare evasion and not in my back yard (NIMBY) problems.
In the context of organizations and personnel economics, one can apply the model to team work. A forceful
and more extensive argument for the application to tax-evasion as well as NIMBY and crime can be found in
Kahan (2005). In all of these cases there is circumstantial evidence that the adverse e⁄ect of incentives outlined
above is at work. Isolating and assessing the economic importance of these e⁄ects could be the subject of future
research.
7.1 Tax compliance
Tax evasion ￿ts the model well, because it is a hidden activity: Any single tax-payer has very incomplete
information on how honestly others pay their taxes. Tax o¢ ces on the other hand collect statistics on evasion
rates. This makes tax-policies a vehicle of signals on how widespread tax evasion is.
Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence that conditional cooperation is a prevalent attitude in tax compli-
ance. Econometric studies show that both on an individual level (Scholz, 1998) and on an aggregate (national)
level (Frey and Torgler, 2006) the decision to evade taxes is largely based on dispositional attitudes. Especially
important are the belief that fellow taxpayers evade and the perceived legitimacy of the use of tax revenue.
Experimental evidence yields the same results. Coleman (1997) reports the results of the Minnesota tax
experiment, in which 47,000 tax payers received a letter announcing increased audit probability. The responses
with respect to reported income were mixed. In one treatment, the experimenters sent another letter to 20,000
tax-payers saying that the numbers of cheating tax-payers was much lower than commonly assumed. This
signi￿cantly increased reported income. She⁄rin and Triest (1992) ￿nd that highly publicized campaigns against
tax evasion often fail to have the desired e⁄ect, and that some forms of publicity about these campaigns may
increase distrust in other citizens. This distrust in turn is a determinant of evasion in their estimations.
Furthermore, this paper can explain the fact that ￿nes and audit rates are generally too low to be credible
deterrents. Instead of relying on deterrence, governments realize that people are motivated by reciprocal prefer-
ences and choose to apply a low ￿ne. Another prediction of the model is that in equilibrium, high sanctions on
tax evasion only make a di⁄erence for low types. High types will pay their taxes for any equilibrium sanction.
This ￿ts well with empirical results. Wenzel (2004) shows in the context of tax evasion that o¢ cial sanctions
are e⁄ective only for those that have a weak personal norm of paying taxes. People with strong personal norms
on the other hand also cooperate for low sanctions.
157.2 Support for the welfare state
Conditional cooperation is one of the driver forces behind the welfare state. Fong et al. (2005) show based on
a multitude of evidence that the most important reason for people to oppose the welfare state is the conviction
that the poor are lazy. This is true for the poor as well as the rich. By contrast, people indicate in interviews
that they are willing to support those that are temporarily unlucky but willing to search for a job. This research
is conducted in the United States, but the ￿ndings ￿t perfectly with those of Mau (2003) who compares support
for the welfare state in both Germany and the United Kingdom3.
In such a setting, the model predicts that strong sanctions on laziness of the unemployed (i.e. unwillingness to
look for a job) will encourage job search and reduce bene￿t-dependence through the coercive e⁄ect. Paradoxically
however, it will also reinforce the idea among employed and unemployed that the unemployed are lazy. Because
the employed are not subjected to sanctions that force them to cooperate, for them the crowding out e⁄ect will
dominate and undermine their willingness to cooperate with the unemployed, i.e. support the welfare state.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper asks whether Hobbesian coercion in collective action problems remains optimal when society is a
mix of conditional cooperators and egoists. What is the optimal policy to promote cooperation if the collective
action problem in question is a prisoners dilemma for some and a coordination game for others? The paper
shows that the optimal level of sanctions depends on the relative proportions of the two agents in society and
describes how o¢ cial incentives can crowd out trust in rational agents. When there are many egoists, the
high sanction or Hobbesian solution is optimal. When there are many conditional cooperators, a policy of low
sanctions is more e¢ cient. This means that high sanctions crowd out, and low sanctions crowd in trust. This
in turn implies that its superior information allows government to induce or crowd in cooperation by setting
low sanctions. It will therefore set lower sanctions on average relative to a situation with full information.
There are three main conditions that drive this crowding out result: the citizens are a heterogenous mixture
of conditional cooperators and egoists, the government has more information than its citizens about the type
of people in society, and sanctions are costly to implement. Under these circumstances sanctions provide the
conditional cooperators with a cue about the proportion of egoists, which is crucial for their willingness to
cooperate. The paper thus shows that sanctions may have a dual role. They both change economic payo⁄s and
alter agents￿perception of the environment.
When the environment consists predominantly of conditional cooperators, a picture that seems to emerge
from experimental evidence, cooperation can be mainly achieved by relying on trust. Under such circumstances,
a policy implemented by a Hobbesian minded government that departs from the view that people are egoists is
unnecessarily costly. It may also generate negative social e⁄ects that are associated with diminished trust.
There are important aspects of collective action that the model does not capture. One such aspect are framing
e⁄ects. Sanctions could be accompanied by signals that guide their interpretation. A principal that manages to
punish the egoists, but at the same time convey the message that many people are in fact complying, will not
crowd out trust. In contrast, she will reassure the conditional cooperators that they are not suckers that pay
the collective bill on their own. To take up the example of tax evasion again, there is evidence that the nature of
publicity about tax evasion matter. She⁄rin and Triest (1992) expose groups in an experimental setting to two
statements about tax evasion. One says that the tax authorities have stepped up detection e⁄orts. The other
adds that these increased e⁄orts are taken because the ￿ tax gap￿(due taxes that have remained uncollected)
has reached 100 billion dollars. The authors show that the second statement signi￿cantly decreases trust in
3For a more extensive survey, see Benabou and Tirole (2006).
16other taxpayers. In the econometric part of their paper this latter variable is found to be a determinant of the
decision to evade.
Another limitation is the static nature of the model that makes it impossible to evaluate potential forward
looking e⁄ects of sanctions. To the extent that people expect others to be more likely to cooperate after higher
sanctions are introduced, the e⁄ects of sanctions on beliefs may be more complicated.
9 References
BØnabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Belief in a just world and redistributive politics." The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121:2 pp. 699-746.
BØnabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation." Review of Economic Studies,
70, pp. 489-520.
Cardenas, Juan Camilo, John Stranlund and Cleve Willis. 2000. "Local Environmental Control and
Institutional Crowding-Out."
World Development, 28(10), pp 1719-1733.
Coleman, Stephen. 1997. "Income tax compliance: A unique experiment in Minnesota". Government Finance
Review, 13, pp. 11-15.
Fehr, Ernst and Simon G￿chter. 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity." Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 14:3, pp. 159-81.
Fischbacher, Urs and Simon G￿chter. 2006. "Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free
Riding in Public Goods." IZA Working Paper 2011.
Fong, Christina M., Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis. 2005. "Reciprocity and the Welfare State," in Moral
Sentiments and Material Interests. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr eds.
Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 277-302.
Frey, Bruno S. and Reto Jegen. 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory." Journal of Economic Surveys, 15:5, pp.
589-611.
Frey, Bruno S. and Stephan Meier. 2004. "Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing ￿ Conditional
Cooperation￿in a Field Experiment", American Economic Review, 94(5), pp. 1717-22.
Frey, B. S., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (1997). "The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation
crowding-out". American Economic Review, 87 (3), pp. 746￿ 755
Frey, Bruno S. and Benno Torgler. 2007. "Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation." Journal of Comparative
Economics, Forthcoming.
G￿chter, Simon. 2006. "Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the ￿eld and their
policy implications." CeDEx Discussion Paper, 2006-03.
G￿chter, Simon, Esther Kessler, and Manfred K￿nigstein. 2007. "Performance Incentives and the Dynamics of
Voluntary Cooperation." mimeo.
Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini. 2000a. "A Fine is a Price." Journal of Legal Studies, 29, pp. 1-17.
Ichino, Andrea and Maggi, Giovanni, 2000. "Work Environment And Individual Background: Explaining
Regional Shirking Di⁄erentials In A Large Italian Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 1057-1090.
Kahan, Dan M. 2005. "The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law," in Moral Sentiments
and Material Interests. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr eds. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 339-78.
17Kolm, Ann-So￿e, Hedstrom, Peter and Yvonne Aberg. 2003. "Social Interactions and Unemployment".
Uppsala University Economics Working Paper No. 2003:18.
Mau, Ste⁄en. 2003. The Moral Economy of Welfare States, Britain and Germany compared. London:
Routledge.
Ostman, A., 1998. "External control may destroy the commons". Rationality and Society 10 (1), pp. 103￿ 122.
Scholz, John T. 1998. "Trust, Taxes, and Compliance," in Trust and Governance. Valerie Braithwaite and
Margaret Levi eds. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 135-65.
She⁄rin, Steven M. and Robert K. Triest. 1992. "Can Brute Deterrence Back￿re? Perceptions and Attitutes
in Taxpayer Compliance", in Why People Pay Taxes, J. Slemrod ed.
Sliwka, Dirk. 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes."
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Souvorov, A. 2003. Addiction to Rewards, Mimeo GREMAQ, Toulouse.
Wenzel, Michael. 2004. "The Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as Moderators of
Deterrence", Law and Human Behavior, 28:5, pp. 547-567.
10 Appendix A: utilitarian social welfare4
Here I show that the proof of propositions 1 and 2 holds true also if the principal has a utilitarian objective
function of the form W =
P
i ui ￿ ￿g. However, in this case the mechanism in operation is a bit less ￿ clean￿
in the following sense: Since high types derive more utility from cooperation than low types, the government￿ s
payo⁄ in case the cooperative outcome is reached depends on the types that are around in the economy. The
government therefore has a higher motivation to induce the citizens cooperate when they are a high type than
when they are a low type. Benabou and Tirole (2003) distinguish this ￿ pro￿t e⁄ect￿from the ￿ trust e⁄ect￿that
arises from the principals￿superior knowledge.
We ￿rst see under what conditions Proposition 1 holds for the new social welfare function. From the
symmetry of the game and our assumptions on the payo⁄s we can deduce that 2￿(C;C) > ￿(C;D) + ￿(D;C).
Hence, mutual cooperation gives the highest aggregate utility, and also in this case the government prefers to
e⁄ect the cooperative outcome. For proposition 1 to hold we need then only ￿nd the value of ￿ for which the
government always prefers to set g = 1 rather than g = 0. For this it is su¢ cient that:
￿ < 2(￿(C;C) ￿ ￿(D;D)) (9)
Therefore, we can replace condition B
￿ ￿ 1 in Proposition 1 with (9) and the rest of the proof goes through
unaltered. This should not be surprising, since the new objective function preserves the essential element needed
for the result, namely that payo⁄s for the government are highest when there is mutual cooperation between
the citizens.
With respect to proposition 2, the beliefs and the reactions of the citizens to the government policy are
identical. The relation between g2 and x is unaltered. The di⁄erence comes in the calculation of the optimal
government policy. Setting E[W(g1)] = E[W(g2)] now yields the expression:





(￿x(x + ￿(C;C)) + (￿(C;C) ￿ ￿(D;D)) + 1) (10)
4Calculations and simulations are available on request.
18Again, we can make use of the implicit function theorem to ascertain that x(￿;￿(C;C);￿(D;D)) is decreasing
in ￿ in the range x 2 [0;1]. This establishes the equivalence to Proposition 2a) for the utilitarian social welfare
function. Proposition 2b) holds because the relation between x and g2 is unaltered.
Two further facts are noteworthy. First, we have lim￿!0 x(￿) = 1, which also makes intuitive sense: if
sanctions are costless, the government always sets the high sanction. Second, simulation yields that @
2x
@￿@z > 0,
where z = ￿(C;C) ￿ ￿(D;D): The higher the di⁄erence between ￿(C;C) and ￿(D;D), the slower x decreases
in ￿. This makes sense intuitively: if ￿(C;C) is high relative to ￿(D;D), cooperation yields high welfare and
the government will want to make sure that citizens cooperate. Therefore, it will be more likely to set g1 (i.e.
a high x) for a given cost ￿.
11 Appendix B: best response of high types










b(￿)(￿(￿(C;C) + 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(C;D))d￿ ￿
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The government will thus set sanctions exactly in this way, because it is the cheapest way to induce coop-
eration.
12 Appendix C: relaxing asymmetric information5
An interesting question how the results depend on the information asymmetry in the model. Note that there is
a double information asymmetry: The agent knows more about her own type, whereas the principal knows more
about the distribution of types. If the individual types would be known to the principal, he would simply set
g = 0 for conditional cooperators and g = 1 for egoists. On the other hand, if the agents knew the distribution
of types ￿ the signalling e⁄ect would disappear. However, the policy would look similar: The principal would
5For want of explicit expressions for x and ￿, the results in this appendix rely on simulations. The MATLAB codes for these
are available on request.
19set g1 = 1 in bad state of the worlds and g2 = 1 ￿ ￿ in good state with the threshold value of ￿ between the
two policies (call it d) depending on the expected payo⁄s from the two policies. We can compute the relation
between d and B
￿ :
E[W(g1)] = E[W(g2)]






Using the implicit function theorem once more we can establish that d is increasing in B




Therefore, under symmetric information about the distribution of types the government will set a low sanction
only when B
￿ is not too high. To see the di⁄erence with the asymmetric information case, we compare d with
x, the lowest observed distribution for which the government sets a low penalty under asymmetric information.
For lack of explicit expressions, we simulate x and d and we ￿nd that d > x (see ￿ugre 2). Under asymmetric
information the low sanction is more likely to be played.
Another interesting question is whether the government is better o⁄ under asymmetric information. The
answer is that it is not. We ￿nd this answer by comparing the ex-ante expected welfare of the government in
the two situations. Under asymmetric information (AI) ex-ante welfare is given by:




Under symmetric information (SI) it is given by:
E[WSI] = (B ￿ ￿)d ￿
Z 1
d
B￿2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)d￿
Both expressions only depend on B
￿ through x(B
￿ ) and d(B
￿ ). Because we don￿ t have explicit expressions for
d and x we have to rely on simulations again. These yield that welfare is minimally higher under symmetric
information. The government would thus like people to know the state of society, but it can not credibly transfer
the information it has.
Finally we want to know whether the expected ex-ante sanction is higher under asymmetric information or
complete information. To know this we compare the average sanctions under both regimes that are given by
the expressions:
E[gAI] = x ￿ (1 ￿ x)g2(x)
Under symmetric information about ￿ it is given by:




Both expressions only depend on B
￿ through x(B
￿ ) and d(B
￿ ). Once again we have to resort to simulations,
and we ￿nd that expected sanctions are higher under symmetric information.
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